Introduction:
Militias are sine quo non for Myanmar Army. The Militias are both a boon and a bane for Myanmar Army. The Militias draw their cadres from the ethnic tribes ,a hundred plus spread all across Myanmar. To counter the fissiparous tendencies that came to characterise the nation, since irs birth in 1948,could not have been more effective without the Militias, a low cost contraption,that are partisan to the establish-ment.
The Militias are positioned in the Myanmar context in “People’s War” to stem the tide of centrifugal tendencies that came to beset most of the major ethnic groups-Karens, Kachins, Shans and Chins. The Panglong Conference held in February 1947 in the Shan State town of Panglong, failed to assuage the aspirations of the Burmese ethnic groups. Dr Cchavi Vasisht Research Assistant of Vivekananda International Foundation, and a PhD from JNU in her seminal work “Ongoing Crisis in Myanmar & Implications for India notes” Though the military constitutes about 3.25 strong, its effective fighting strength is only about a lakh.”
This situation is not getting any better as the Myanmar Army is facing about 700 PDFs(People's Defence Forces) or roughly 90,000 soldiers out of which 30,000 odd, are LDFs(Local
Defence Forces).Further the Myanmar Army is pitied against the Three Brotherhood Alliance combined TNLA,MDNAA and NDAA is reinforced in 2024 by the presence of the formidable KIA and Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) and Karenni Army(KA). Ruling Burma was not a bed of roses for the first PM of Independent Burma. U Nu headed the office in 1948 on the heels of a gruesome assassination of popular leader Aung Sumg who guided the BIA (Burmese Independence Army) to gain freedom from Great Britain. Insurrections broke out first among the Christian Karens in the east and the pro -government guerrillas called the PVO (People’s Volunteer Organisation) took part in operations with Burmese Army senior commander Ne Win.
Ne Win eventually seized power in 1962 and that put paid to the last hopes for the self autonomy of the Kachins, Chins and the Shans. To understand Burma after independence, it is through its Army that the state began to respond to the threats emanating from internal schisms. In 1958 U Nu facing internal party squabbles put the military on board, in the government, this giving general Ne Win a huge berth, that was the beginning.
Myanmar had never been freed from that initial tor hold the military garnered, thus only giving the country a quasi-civilian rule from 2011-2016 and a fully civilian democracy from 2016-2021 under Daw Aung Sung Suu Kyi’s NLD (National League for Democracy) that was scuttled in February 2021 by overturning a popular mandate by military ruled SAC. Firstly, Ka Kye Ye or pro government militias active since 1973. Pyusawhti or town and village defence scheme involving para military. Pyithusit or militia for People’s war in 1960s. The militias that ate integrated with the Tatmadaw are termed as BGFs (Border Guarding Forces).
There is a second type of non-integrated militias that are not within the command structure of the Tatmadaw. They are from breakaway factions of the EAOs. The third type is Tatmadaw supported community militias. The EAOs also operate militias like the Kachin People’s Militia Group. Pro government militias involve themselves in revenue earning activities, that are diverse in nature.
Militia and Border Guarding Force:
The outbreak of armed revolt among ethnic Shans in 1959 and ethnic Kachins in 1961, and the Communist Party of Burma’s (CPB’s) push into eastern Shan State from China in 1968, posed new, serious challenges to the military government. In the early 1960s, Tatmadaw commanders in Shan State began establishing militias to combat the growing threat of ethno-nationalist insurgencies. Three types of government militias had emerged by the late 1960s; people’s militias ( pyithusit), anti-insurgent groups (Ta Ka Sa Pha) and Ka Kwe Ye militias.
The term “people’s militias,” or pyithusit, refers to militias that were created by the Tatmadaw in the early 1960s under the Ne Win regime and were the forerunners of the Tatmadaw community-based militias. Coordinated by the Tatmadaw, they were created as part of the regime’s national defense strategy. One of their primary duties was to assist with village defense and serve as guides and informers. The anti-insurgent groups were the predecessors of the Tatmadaw non-integrated militias. They received little training, and the Tatmadaw had less control over them. Various sources indicate that these groups were often formed by soldiers from ethnic armed groups and operated in southern Shan State and Karen State.
The Ka Kwe Ye, which means “defense” in Burmese, involved the Tatmadaw recognizing armed groups as Tatmadawallied militia forces and tacitly approving their illicit business activities. During this period, local leaders built up small armed units on their own for purposes of self-defense. For many groups, the status as a Ka Kwe Ye militia offered economic opportunities and the benefits of official recognition by the state.
After 1973, the Tatmadaw reconstituted some of the local defense forces, which had earlier surrendered their weapons, into people’s militias. During this period, the Tatmadaw continued to establish new militias on an ad hoc basis. The militia system featured two main arrangements – the people’s militia forces and the antiinsurgent forces – both of which were guided by local security concerns. During the period from 1989 to 2009, forty armed organizations entered into ceasefire agreements with the military government. The success of the ceasefires is attributed to a combination of military pressure from the Tatmadaw and incentives for a cessation of conflict, along with the promise of economic assistance and political dialogue.
Ne Win disbanded many motifs and formed Special Police Reserve Units. Ka Kwe Ye and Ta Ka Sa Pha were anti-insurgent groups and this militias were used in Shan and Karen State. Ka Kwe Te of Kokang had cornered the Opium trade. SSPP/SSA 3 & 7 brigade became militias. Remaining 1st brigade carried on the war with Tatmadaw. NMSP (New Mon State Party) rejected the ceasefire as did the UWSA. MDNAA and DKBA in Kayin State, that is a splintered group of the KNU, also turned down the BGF proposal. DKBA-Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. Similar to the 1960s-1970s militias, the BGF are used against the KIO, SSPP, KNLA and such big EAOs.
The BGF concept was developed in 2009 by Tatmadaw to weaken the EAOs especially to weaken and splinter the Kachin and Shan EAOs among others. To divest these groups into BGFs and PMFs would weaken them militarily. That was scripted in the proposal that was unveiled by Tatmadaw.
Northern Myanmar from 1960s-1980s saw intense trafficking and druglordism, of Communist CPB and KKY militias. From 1980s-till present the ethnic armies are locked in an existential battle against the Myanmar State. To this cohort is added the security interests of the Chinese State and global power projection of US to contain drug trafficking as well as support State building of the fragmented country. In this dynamics the spatial control of the Myanmar State is reflected as it creates shadow armies out of the ethnic power groups to consolidate the reach of the Burmese state.
Significant Militias and eaos and their structure : The Pa-O National Army (PNA):
The Pa-O National Army (PNA), has been forcefully recruiting and conscripting local youth since the end of May. Kyauktalonegyi residents [in Taunggyi] were trained, armed, and sent to the frontline.” The PNA, once an ethnic Pa-O rebel group, entered into a ceasefire agreement with the central authorities in April 1991 and became what could be best described as an auxiliary force to the Myanmar army. Wealthy northern Shan State residents, regardless of ethnicity, have left Myanmar altogether and settled in Thailand and other neighboring countries. And everyone, rich and poor and whatever nationality they belong to in Myanmar’s ethnically most diverse state, have been caught in the crossfire between the warring factions and have had to endure intense and indiscriminate bombardments by the Myanmar Air Force.
The New Democratic Army:Sometimes referred to as
Sometimes referred to as the New Democratic ArmyKachin, which had only a few hundred men, was the smallest group. Led by Sakhon Ting Ying, it had a small base area along the Chinese border in eastern Kachin State and established its headquarters at Pangwa.
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA):
Palaungs set up PNF (Palaungs National Front) in 1963
that allied with SSIA(Shan State Independence Army). Later it became a part of SSA(Shan State Army).Sao Hso Lane was an important leader of the Palaungs. In 1976, the Palaungs broke ranks with SSA and set up PSLA (Palaungs State Liberation Army), that is more closer to KIA. Out of the PSLA, the TNLA (Ta”ang National Liberation Front) emerged in 2009.
Shan State Army (SSA) :The SSA made its appearance in 1964 in the Shan State. The Shan State Army (SSA) refers to armed groups that represent the Shan ethnic population in Myanmar, primarily advocating for Shan autonomy and rights. In 1976 the SSA was divided into two main factions
The SSA made its appearance in 1964 in the Shan State. The Shan State Army (SSA) refers to armed groups that represent the Shan ethnic population in Myanmar, primarily advocating for Shan autonomy and rights. In 1976 the SSA was divided into two main factions (1) Shan State Army - North (SSA-N). This group was established to fight for the autonomy and rights of the Shan people, making it one of the older ethnic armed groups in Myanmar and (2) Shan State Army - South (SSA-S). This group initially aimed for complete independence for Shan State but has since
shifted its goals toward achieving greater autonomy, federalism, and self-determination within a democratic Myanmar.
RCSS (Restoration Council of Shan State):
The RCSS is a political organization representing the interests of the Shan ethnic group in Myanmar. It serves as the political wing of the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) and plays a central role in advocating for the rights and autonomy of the Shan people. The RCSS was established in 1976, alongside the formation of the SSA-S, following the dissolution of the Mong Tai Army (MTA) led by Khun Sa.
Lasang Awng Wa Peace Group:
Lasang awng Wa peace group of defector KIA intelligence Chief Col Lasang Awng Wa turned in to a pro-government militian in 2009 after negotions with Tatmadaw.If the NSCN,KYA joins the offensive for NUG against Myanmar Army alongwith KIA (Kachin Independence Army) in sagaing, then the Lasang Awng Wa group will be used as a counter-force.
Shan State Politics and Armed Insurgency:
The first and foremost cause of Shan armed struggle came out of the Panglong Agreement signed between the Burmese leader General Aung San and other ethnic leaders in 1947 during the struggle for independence. The Agreement in theory grants the right of secession to Shan State 10 years after joining the Union of Burma. The 1947 Constitution also states the right of secession after 10 years to the Shan and Kayah States. While in principle a genuine right, in practice, it is hardly exercisable due to the demand for an extraordinary majority requirement of two thirds in the State Council.
Second, like any other insurgency in the world, the origin of the conflicts can be linked to discrimination, and sense of unfair treatment in the distribution of resources and power. The war between the Burmese government and the ethnic nationalities left many ethnic areas in a dire situation. While Shan State may be rich in natural resources, unfair distribution by the military government of the profits generated from natural resource extraction has been a major cause of grievances.
The third reason comes arguably from the political economy of war. With the involvement of the American CIA, the Communist Party of Burma, the Communist Party of China, the Kuomintang, and the Thai government, the ethnic wars in 1960s-1980s were largely part of the Cold War. Besides, Shan State had emerged as a major opium-growing area and the narcotics trade soon became a vital source of revenue for all insurgencies, and sustained the armed resistance in that state for more than half a century.
The Shan have two armed groups: the SSPP/SSA, and the RCSS/SSA. The first was originally the Shan State Army (SSA) which changed its name to the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) in 1996. It is known today as the SSANorth. The Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), known as the SSA-South, is a 1996 construction of splinter groups from Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA) which immediately declared their intention to continue fighting the central government after the MTA surrendered. The SSPP signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in January 2012, while the RCSS had signed the first ceasefire in 2011, and a second one in 2012. These two groups should not be seen in isolation from the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a highly
active alliance of 12 ethnic armed forces. The UNFC advocates talks with the government as a united front. Their demands in negotiations with the government concern federalism and are based on the second draft of the 2008 Federal Constitution.
Besides these two forces, there are two political parties representing the Shan. The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy Party (SNLD), better known as the “Tiger Head” party, has long been considered by many to be the true nationalist party of Shan State. In 2005, Khun Htun Oo, its leader, along with other SNLD leaders, was arrested and sentenced to a ridiculously long sentence of 93 years of imprisonment by the former military junta. The SNLD did not compete in the 2010 election and hence does not have a seat in parliament. The Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), better known as the “White Tiger” party, was formally registered in April 2010 and after the election, became the biggest party in Shan State. It won 51 seats in the Parliament in the 2010 elections. These two parties are not involved in the ceasefire negotiations and their role is to come later during the Political Dialogue phase. The Political Dialogue will see a diversification of stakeholders to include political parties, and civil society and women’s groups.